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Abstract
The U.S. EPA designates areas as in non-attainment with National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) if ambient air concentrations of certain pollutants
exceed standard levels. Stationary sources located in these areas are required to
significantly reduce emissions through technological and other requirements; these
sources are also subjected to greater regulatory oversight. However, non-attainment
is not a permanent designation and regulatory oversight subsides once an area moves
out of non-attainment. In this paper we examine whether the additional regulatory
oversight of non-attainment designation is successful (and necessary) at reducing
emissions from stationary sources. We estimate the effects of an area moving out of
non-attainment on emissions at coal-fired power plants located in these areas. We
first model the actions of utility managers subjected to emission reduction require-
ments. The model suggests that firms under additional scrutiny via non-attainment
designation intentionally lower emissions. However, when areas exit non-attainment,
i.e., direct regulatory oversight subsides, firms under-utilize clean strategies - includ-
ing technology - which results in emission increases. Empirical analysis results show
that boilers with abatement technology installed as a result of non-attainment in-
crease NOx emissions and emission rate by 16% and 9%, respectively, when exiting
non-attainment. Extended model results present evidence that regulated firms are
less likely to use fully emission control methods in the absence of direct regulatory
oversight. Specifically, the emission increases of exiting non-attainment are driven
by the under-utilization of abatement technology inputs and the switch to lower
quality fuel.
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1 Introduction
The Clean Air Act (CAA) created air quality standards to control ambient concentra-
tions of six “criteria” air pollutants that are especially harmful to human health (see, e.g.,
Muller and Mendelsohn 2009) and the environment. These National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) control ambient concentrations of the following pollutants: partic-
ulate matter (PM)1, ozone, lead, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and sulfur dioxide
(SO2). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for designing
ambient air quality standards for these pollutants, which are administered nationally but
enforced at the county level. EPA examines pollution concentrations within geographic
areas and designates each as in “attainment” with individual NAAQS or, if pollutant
concentrations exceed standard levels, as “non-attainment”.
Non-attainment areas as a whole are subjected to greater regulatory scrutiny and
oversight than attainment areas. Stationary emission sources in non-attainment areas are
subjected to several regulatory requirements as part of State Implementation Plans (SIPs)
required by EPA, including technological requirements, facility-specific emission limits,
and greater and more frequent oversight and monitoring (Walker 2013). Importantly, non-
attainment status is not a permanent designation. The goal of EPA is to bring ambient
concentrations of criteria pollutants below the appropriate NAAQS in non-attainment
areas; states can then request for these areas to be re-designated as in attainment with
the NAAQS.2 Once the area is no longer designated as non-attainment, the watchful
“eye” of the regulator is no longer drawn to the area. This de-prioritization and reduced
oversight results in less monitoring, which affects emissions and benefits provided to local
communities (Gray and Shadbegian 2004; Lim 2016).
The purpose of this paper is to examine how regulated firms respond when the in-
creased oversight of NAAQS non-attainment designation no longer applies. Rather than
look at the overall emission effects of non-attainment designation, we focus exclusively on
1Total Suspended Particulates prior to 1987 and PM after 1987.
2Areas that leave non-attainment are designated as “maintenance” for at least ten years. For ease of
exposition, we refer to these areas as in “attainment” with the standards because ambient air concentra-
tions are below standard levels.
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the effect of areas changing out of non-attainment on stationary source emissions. Sev-
eral studies examine the effect of non-attainment designation on emissions at stationary
sources (e.g., Raff and Walter 2017; Gibson 2018). However, these studies focus on county
level entrance into non-attainment and the effects on emissions while in non-attainment,
while we identify the effects based on county level entrance out of non-attainment. The
regulatory requirements of non-attainment designation are lessened when areas meet the
appropriate NAAQS; regulatory monitoring and oversight decreases and facility-specific
emission limits are not enforced as strictly, if at all. Additionally, required abatement
technologies have high variable costs (Xu et al. 2015) and inputs are priced differen-
tially. Abatement technology presence and differential input usage without monitoring
and oversight does not ensure that emission reducing strategies are operated in ways that
will decrease emissions to acceptable levels. Non-attainment designation is also exogenous
to each stationary source’s emissions because the average facility contributes little to am-
bient air concentrations of criteria pollutants (Auffhammer et al. 2011; Gibson 2018). As a
result, firm managers may abate less because they feel the “storm has passed”, especially
if managers perceive that agencies have fixed monitoring budgets (Raff and Earnhart
2018). Finally, the primary purpose of SIPs are to bring the ambient air concentrations of
criteria pollutants below standard levels. If areas do not make sufficient progress toward
attaining the standard, EPA can impose further requirements. As a greater incentive to
reach attainment, states with areas that remain in non-attainment can have highway or
other federal funds withheld. Incentives such as these do not exist for areas that meet the
standards and thus, the urgency with which states control emissions in non-attainment
areas can be impacted. Holistically then, our study examines whether emission changes
at stationary sources made while in non-attainment are permanent and continue into the
future (as mandated in each SIP) even without direct regulatory oversight.
There exist many economic studies that examine the effects of the NAAQS and non-
attainment status on different outcomes. Several studies attribute emission decreases of
the past several decades at least partially to the NAAQS (Henderson 1996; Chay and
Greenstone 2003; Walker 2013). More specifically, non-attainment designation played a
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“minor” role in the decrease of ambient SO2 concentrations in the United States during the
1990s (Greenstone 2004) and significantly decreased PM emissions in the United States
during the same time frame Auffhammer et al. (2009). Bi (2017) and Gibson (2018)
use Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data to examine how non-attainment status of air
pollutants impacts emissions to other environmental media, e.g., water, land. Both studies
find a negative relationship between non-attainment status and air emissions. Aside from
emissions and ambient air quality, non-attainment designation increases the age of capital
used at privately-owned electric utilities Nelson et al. (1993). Non-attainment status
also positively affects housing values (Chay and Greenstone 2004) but negatively affects
employment (Greenstone 2002; Walker 2011; Sheriff et al. 2019). Previous work identifies
the effects of non-attainment primarily on the entrance of an area into non-attainment,
rather than identification based solely on an area’s exit from non-attainment. This focus
assumes a lasting impact on emissions and ambient air quality (or other outcomes) from
non-attainment designation and ignores the importance of regulatory oversight. The
previous body of literature (specifically that dealing with emissions as the outcome) also
does not examine the use of abatement technology at stationary sources. These studies
focus on the effects of non-attainment in aggregate without exploring the mechanisms
through which emission decreases occur or how firm manager behavior changes in different
regulatory scenarios.
This study adds to the literature in several important ways. First, we identify the
effects on emissions of a substantial decrease in regulatory oversight. Previous studies ex-
amine oversight in the context of general deterrence (e.g., Earnhart 2004; Shimshack and
Ward 2005) by examining stochastic regulatory involvement at firms. However, general
deterrence measures vary only slightly and at best these studies identify small decreases
(and increases) in oversight. Our study uses non-attainment exit as a significant and
certain decrease in regulatory oversight. Second, we identify changes in emissions based
on facility exit out of non-attainment rather than entrance into non-attainment. Gibson
(2018) for example, does not consider the change in facility emissions once an area moves
back into attainment with the NAAQS, as emission changes are expected to be perma-
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nent. The author uses a generalized difference-in-differences estimator and considers as
treated all facility-year observations after initial entrance into non-attainment. We exam-
ine the opposite scenario using data on all coal-fired power plants, not only those that are
required to report TRI emissions. Thus, we are the first study to examine the behavior of
firms once the direct regulatory oversight of non-attainment designation subsides, i.e., we
study the effectiveness of increased regulatory oversight of non-attainment designation.
Third, ours is the first study to model theoretically both regulator and firm behavior
under an important government regulation. Finally, we examine the mechanisms through
which firm managers make emission decisions when not subjected to direct regulatory
oversight. There exist strong incentives for states to bring non-attainment areas back
into attainment with the NAAQS. As a result, stationary sources are monitored closely
and emission reductions occur (Raff and Walter 2017). However, once this incentive struc-
ture is removed, behavior may change; no study has examined the ways in which firm
managers change behavior once the regulator is no longer as present.
To develop our contributions, we first model theoretically firm manager and regulator
behavior as a result of non-attainment designation. We identify how regulators can target
firms to reduce emissions and thus, attain ambient air quality standards. Standards can
be met by requiring targeted firms to employ clean strategies, e.g., use of higher-quality
inputs, installation of abatement technology. We show that clean strategies imposed
by regulators will be operated fully by firms if the regulator is present, i.e., additional
regulatory oversight exists. This incentivizes firms to employ fully clean strategies se-
lected by the regulator to avoid additional scrutiny, which minimizes costs (Becker 1968);
this occurs only while the regulator is present under non-attainment designation. Once
firms are no longer subjected to this scrutiny, i.e., the area exits non-attainment, firms
under-utilize clean strategies required previously by the regulator. In addition, permanent
emission reductions from sources required by the regulator may provide “standard slack”,
i.e., emission decreases (and other activities beneficial to ambient air quality) that result
in ambient concentrations well below the NAAQS. This slack allows other sources to fur-
ther increase emissions. As a result, the absence of monitoring in the presence of static
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ambient emission standards can create a scenario which encourages stationary sources to
increase emissions.
We then estimate several regression specifications that examine the effect of facility
exit from non-attainment. We use boiler level data on NOx emissions and emission rate at
coal-fired power plants in the United States from 1995-2016 for this analysis. We consider
as treated those boilers (facilities) that exit non-attainment, rather than those entering
non-attainment. This analysis can determine if emissions changed for boilers previously
regulated by SIPs once the requirements are removed, i.e., regulatory oversight normalizes
to pre-non-attainment levels. Estimation results show that boiler level NOx emissions and
emission rate increase by 16% and 9%, respectively, once facilities are no longer regulated
under non-attainment requirements.
Finally, we examine the mechanisms through which these emission increases occur.
The NAAQS require installation of Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT)
for stationary emission sources in non-attainment areas. However, RACT designation
depends on many factors, e.g., costs, facility age, technological availability, so there is
considerable heterogeneity in this technology throughout the United States. Thus, we
use data on the type of technology at each boiler and its installation date to examine
what technology each facility implemented when in non-attainment. We use this analysis
to test the theoretical assertion that facilities under-utilize abatement technology when
additional regulatory oversight is removed, which we show empirically to be the case;
the significant variable costs associated with abatement systems can be minimized by
under-utilizing technology once direct regulatory oversight is removed. Specifically, we
find significant increases of NOx emissions and emission rate at boilers with technology
that requires substantial variable costs, but no emission or emission rate increases at
boilers with “set it and forget it” abatement technology. We also examine if other clean
strategies used to decrease emissions are abandoned once a facility is no longer subjected
to the SIP requirements of a non-attainment area. We estimate the effect that exiting non-
attainment has on the use of inputs, namely coal type and quality. We find that exiting
non-attainment induces regulated facilities to switch to coal with lower heat content and
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higher ash content, which is considerably cheaper than higher quality coal but more is
required to produce the same level of output; thus, emissions increase. Importantly, we
control for output and examine emission rate so our results do not indicate that managers
simply run plants less when in non-attainment.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background in-
formation on the NAAQS and non-attainment designations, including technological re-
quirements. Sections 3 and 4 provide theoretical analyses for firm behavior and regulator
obectives, respectively. Section 5 provides the primary empirical analysis, including a
discussion of the data used. Section 6 examines mechanisms through which emission
increases occur. Finally, section 7 concludes and issues policy recommendations.
2 Regulatory setting
This section describes the regulatory setting of our study. We first describe the specifics of
the NAAQS, including its designations of areas as non-attainment. We then discuss the
technological requirements for stationary sources located within non-attainment areas,
highlighting RACT requirements for stationary source emissions of NOx.
2.1 NAAQS and non-attainment designation
The CAA of 1970 established the NAAQS to protect human health and the environment
from especially harmful air pollutants. There exist two types of ambient air quality stan-
dards: (1) primary standards, which are tighter, i.e., lower, and provide public health
protection (focusing on vulnerable populations, e.g., asthmatics) and (2) secondary stan-
dards, which protect the environment and public welfare (EPA 2018a). Areas are con-
sidered in “non-attainment” with individual NAAQS if ambient concentrations of that
criteria air pollutant exceeds standard levels.
Once an area is designated as non-attainment, the state must submit to EPA a SIP
outlining steps that the state will take to bring that area into attainment with the relevant
NAAQS. Stationary emission sources in non-attainment areas are subjected to increased
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regulatory stringency and oversight as a result of non-attainment designation and individ-
ual SIPs. (Mobile emission sources, e.g., motor vehicles, and other sources of emissions,
e.g., outdoor wood-burning, are also the subject of SIP requirements.) First, station-
ary sources must install appropriate emission abatement technology; in this sense, the
NAAQS serve as technological standards. All stationary sources in non-attainment ar-
eas are required to install RACT systems, which are emission control technologies that
are reasonably available and technologically and economically feasible. New or modified
stationary sources located in non-attainment areas face even stricter technological re-
quirements; facilities must obtain New Source Review (NSR) permits, which require the
installation of Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) technology, regardless of cost.3
Second, stationary sources classified as major emitters, e.g., coal-fired power plants, in
non-attainment areas are subjected to plant-specific regulations, i.e., emission limits, and
as a result are subjected to greater and more frequent oversight and monitoring (Walker
2013). Finally, EPA can impose further requirements (in addition to those in SIPs) for
areas that fail to reach attainment with the standards, e.g., fuel requirements, emission
offsets. States can also lose federal funds, e.g., highway funds, for failing to reach attain-
ment status after a certain period of time.
States can petition for areas to be re-designated as attainment once ambient air con-
centrations of non-attainment pollutants fall below standard levels. Before being labeled
as in attainment with the NAAQS, areas are first considered maintenance areas for 10
years following achievement of the relevant standard. As part of the petition process,
states must submit to EPA a maintenance plan that outlines how the area will remain
in attainment. The maintenance plan must show that the ambient air quality changes
and emission decreases that occurred during non-attainment are the result of permanent
actions, e.g., technology installation, and how the area will maintain ambient air qual-
ity for at least 10 years. Importantly, the requirements of maintenance plans are not as
strict as those of SIPs, i.e., additional regulatory scrutiny and oversight associated with
3Stationary sources in attainment counties are not required by the NAAQS to install any emission
control technology. New or modifying plants however, are required to install Best Available Control
Technology (BACT).
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non-attainment is reduced because ambient air quality has reached acceptable levels (as
determined by EPA).
2.2 Technological requirements of the NAAQS
Major stationary emission sources4 in non-attainment areas are required to install RACT
equipment for the control of criteria air pollutants, including those affected by NOx emis-
sions: PM and ground-level ozone.5 New or modifying facilities are required to install
BACT/LAER technology, which are more substantial than RACT and costs are con-
sidered immaterial. We focus our discussion on RACT requirements because these are
the primary requirements of non-attainment areas. Table 1 presents a list of criteria air
pollutants and those whose ambient air concentrations are affected by NOx emissions.
Non-attainment designation for pollutants whose ambient air concentrations are affected
by NOx emissions requires at least RACT installation for control of NOx emissions. RACT
requirements of non-attainment and SIPs are subjective and EPA provides only broad re-
quirements.6 EPA’s NOx RACT summary suggests that states consider total cost, total
emission reductions, and cost effectiveness of controls needed to achieve emission limits
or equipment standards when determining RACT EPA (2018b). Finally, EPA’s “Menu
of Control Measures for NAAQS Implementation” contains over 250 emission reduction
measures, many of which can be considered RACT.
EPA does not encourage a broad adoption of all cost effective abatement technology.
In general, EPA “believes it would be unreasonable to require that a plan which demon-
strates attainment include all technologically and economically available control measures
even though such measures would expedite attainment.” SIPs are expected to map out
and make reasonable progress toward attainment with linear emission reductions. The
method is largely determined by the state (but must be approved by EPA). However,
4Emission sources with the potential to emit “100 tons per year of any air pollutant” EPA (2018b).
5Ambient concentrations of nitrogen dioxide (a criteria air pollutant) are also affected by NOx emis-
sions. However, all counties in our sample had reached attainment with nitrogen dioxide standards by
1995. Thus, we focus on the two applicable standards.
6However, for certain emission sources, e.g., electric utilities, EPA establishes set emission limits (EPA
2018b).
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Table 1: Relationship of NOx emissions to
criteria air pollutants
Criteria air pollutant Affected by NOx
emissions
Sulfur dioxide
Nitrogen dioxide X
Particulate Matter X
Ground-level ozone X
Carbon monoxide
Lead
Notes: An X represents that the particular crite-
ria air pollutant’s ambient concentrations are di-
rectly affected by emissions of NOx. An X also
represents that stationary emission sources in ar-
eas designated as non-attainment for those pollu-
tants are required to install at least RACT systems
for NOx emissions. All areas in our sample had
reached attainment for nitrogen dioxide by 1995,
so our analysis focuses on PM and ground-level
ozone non-attainment.
the technology requirements of a SIP are to identify, plan, and demonstrate how an area
will obtain attainment and not to install all cost effective abatement technology available.
As a specific example for lead non-attainment, EPA states explicitly that RACT require-
ments of a SIP will be approved even without appropriate technology if it can be proven
that attainment will be reached (EPA 1990).
EPA states that the philosophy behind RACT identification is that it is reasonable
for similar sources to bear similar emission reduction costs (EPA 1990). However, an
important secondary requirement of economic feasibility exists: reasonability. RACT
determination considers the difference in technology costs among similar sources with
implemented emission reductions, but takes into account whether the firm’s installation
costs of technology are affordable. Simply put, technology requirements are based on cost
and effectiveness of the installed technology on a similar source. This policy provides
states considerable flexibility in reaching attainment, which can require management of a
variety of emission sources concurrently.
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3 Firm behavior under regulatory oversight
In this section we create a representative firm and model the influence of regulators on
firm operations and the use of clean strategies, i.e., methods to decrease emissions. Our
goal is to identify how regulators influence firm operations to improve ambient air quality
after an area fails to meet the NAAQS and is designated as non-attainment. Regulators,
as part of a SIP, can require firms to undertake a variety of actions to reduce emissions.
We examine how firm level emissions change as regulatory obligations are met in the
context of ambient air quality standards.
3.1 Firm operation and profit
We begin with a simple representative firm unconcerned with emissions. Firm i creates
emissions as a typical part of operation according to ei = (ek − δi)q, where e represents
initial per unit emissions scaled according to the age of initial production equipment k (ek
increases with age), q represents firm output, and δi represents calibration of production
inputs to decrease emissions (δ ∈ [0, 1]).7 In the absence of direct regulatory oversight, a
firm can voluntarily choose its level of calibration to reduce emissions.
Operations at a traditional coal-fired power plant can be altered depending on the
firm’s concern with emissions. For example, equipment maintenance, boiler adjustment,
reaction temperature, and shutdown cycles all impact a plant’s input costs. As examples,
Liu et al. (2007) examine the effect of coal combustion parameters on PM emissions
and Romero et al. (2006) discuss the impact of boiler operating conditions on mercury
emissions at coal-fired utility boilers. In general, calibration can decrease firm emissions
and fuel usage, resulting in efficiency gains (through cost savings) and emission reductions.
However, at a certain point calibration to further reduce emissions can increase non-fuel
input and operational costs.
Operational decisions have a significant impact on firm profit. The price(s) firms
7The calibration of inputs includes operating decisions that decrease emissions, which may decrease
fuel requirements but increase production costs, e.g., equipment maintenance, boiler calibration, shut-
down optimization.
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receive for output is dependent on the regulatory structure of electric utilities. Before
electricity market restructuring, i.e., deregulation, most firm’s prices were set by public
utility commissions (Fowlie 2010). In addition, firms in regulated areas must meet market
demand to ensure effective grid management. For firms in deregulated areas, electricity
provision includes other electrical producers (using other energy sources) representing
a broad interdependence between competing providers. We assume price and output
requirements for a firm are exogenous regardless of the electricity market’s regulatory
structure and thus, a firm’s profit maximization requires boiler optimization:
max
δi
pii,k = (p− (1− δi + δ2i )ck)q (1)
where p represents price and q represents output. A plant’s age is relevant for several
reasons, most notably technology and design. Therefore, a firm’s production costs, ck,
depend on boiler age (k). For ease, we let “o” denote old plants and “u” denote new or
modified plants where co > cu.
Profit maximizing firms optimize production processes to minimize cost given some
level of exogenous output. Equation (1) shows that firms, left to their own devices, will
cost minimize where δ∗ = 1
2
, resulting in emissions of ei = (ek− 12)q. Simply put, firms will
calibrate equipment to make inputs as productive as possible without regard for emissions.
3.2 Emission reductions
Multiple options outside of production calibration exist to reduce emissions. In this
sub-section, we incorporate additional emission-reducing techniques into our model be-
cause regulators can require emission reductions for firms located in non-attainment ar-
eas. For instance, non-attainment designation requires SIPs which identify strategies to
reduce emissions. SIPs can subject stationary sources to emission inventories, installation
of RACT/LAER systems, clean fuel programs, and enhanced monitoring, among other
things (EPA 2018c).8 These (emission-reducing) strategies influence firm i’s emissions
8Required elements depend on the timeline to attainment and can include major source statements
(for sources with over 100 tons of emissions), attainment demonstration, NSR offset ratios, and other
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according to:
ei = (ek − δi − si − xi)q (2)
where xi represents the use of cleaner fuels in the production process (where xi ∈ [0, x])
and si represents the use of emission capture, i.e., abatement, technology. The employ-
ment of abatement technology causes some reduction in emissions (therefore si ∈ [s, s]),
however, the relative effectiveness depends on decisions related to the operation and main-
tenance of the technology.
Firms located in non-attainment areas are required to install at least RACT systems.
These abatement technologies have significant installation, maintenance, and operating
costs.9 In addition, SIPs can require that firms adopt cleaner fuel inputs.10 At the
same time, firms can voluntarily decrease emissions by employing clean strategies, e.g.,
cleaner inputs, abatement technology. Profit for firms employing these clean strategies is
represented by:
pii,k =
[
p− F (xi, δi)− (1− δi + δ2i )ck − T (si)
]
q
where F (xi, δi) represents the additional costs of cleaner fuel and T (si) represents the cost
of operating installed abatement technology. Any changes due to updating or installing
boiler equipment alters the production costs of firms with older equipment (from co to
cu).
A firm’s production method also changes due to the cleaner production strategies
employed. To incorporate the cost of cleaner fuel, we assume fuel prices reflect the quality
and associated emission reductions,11 ceteris paribus. Fuel prices increase quadratically
vehicle requirements.
9We are not concerned with the adoption/installation of abatement technology, but its use. Therefore,
we omit fixed costs.
10Our focus on “cleaner fuel” does not consider the sulfur content of different coal types, because we
do not examine SO2 emission regulations. Our focus is exclusively on heat and ash contents of the coal;
we discuss this further in section 6.
11Coal prices incorporate heat content and ash (non-combustible) content of coal. In-
deed, coal with higher heat content and lower ash content (bituminous) costs considerably
more per short ton (roughly four times) than lesser quality coal (sub-bituminous, lignite)
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according to quality such that F (xi) = αx
2
i−δixi, where α is a parameter representing cost
associated with location or transportation. However, the associated emission reduction
from cleaner coal is linear. Our representation of fuel cost is structured to incorporate
the benefits of using higher quality (and cleaner) fuel from an operational and emissions
standpoint since higher quality fuel can reduce plant maintenance costs and improve
worker conditions.12
The installation of abatement technology is a significant fixed cost for any firm. How-
ever, our interest is in the operation and maintenance of technology which requires sub-
stantial inputs for proper operation. The use of reagents necessary for abatement tech-
nology increases coal use and by extension coal ash byproducts (EPA 2017a), further
increasing operating costs. We represent operating costs of an emission-capturing tech-
nology as T (si) =
βs2i
2
, where greater expenditures on inputs (si) yields larger emission
reductions.13
Our interest is in technology where management of the technology can affect emissions.
Abatement technology that lacks inputs still has fixed costs but likely has low operational
costs. Equipment that requires routine maintenance to operate efficiently would still rep-
resent abatement technology that requires inputs, however, most post-combustion clean
technology operates through chemical reaction or filtration, both of which also require
non-labor inputs. Equipment that adjusts combustion changes the boiler’s operations
which affects ek; this equipment would then be influenced by δi. (This is also equiva-
lent to updating components of the boiler.) For the remaining technology, there exists
a minimum variable cost that a firm will spend to maintain operation of the abatement
technology and thus, s¯ > 0.14
Substituting fuel and technology costs into the firm’s profit function gives the following
[https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/table31.pdf].
12Build up of coal ash increases the frequency of equipment cleaning and byproduct disposal.
13This mirrors the use of a slurry or limestone in flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) to reduce SO2 emissions
or the use of ammonia or urea in the case of selective non-catalytic (or catalytic) reduction (SNCR or
SCR) to reduce NOx emissions.
14Different technologies have different input requirements. We examine the implications of using dif-
ferent technologies in later sections.
13
objective for firms voluntarily considering these emission control measures:15
max
xi,δ,si
pii,k =
[
p− αx2i + δi (xi + ck)− (1 + δ2i )ck −
βs2i
2
]
q (3)
From the regulator’s perspective, equation (3) illustrates three potential approaches
to encourage or require firms to curb emissions: production inputs, emission capture tech-
nology, and firm operations. We begin by examining (voluntary) firm emission-reducing
efforts with additional access to clean strategies. Firms optimize equation (3) by selecting
the cost-minimizing input combination. For brevity, we assume that the representative
firm has all three clean strategies available, i.e., abatement technology is already installed
and alternative fuel choices are available. This yields the following emission results (we
denote the firm’s optimal decisions with “*”):16
x∗i =
ck
4αck − 1; δ
∗
i =
2αck
4αck − 1; s
∗
i = s; e
∗
i = ek − ck
2α + 1
4αck − 1 − s (4)
If we compare emission reductions from old (co) and new/modified firms (cu), equation
(4) shows that:17
Remark 1 Older facilities will have higher emission rates, relative to new or recently
modified facilities, ceteris paribus.
Proof. As discussed, co > cu and eu < eo. In addition, the prices of abatement technology
inputs are independent of firm age and therefore consistent across firms. If we compare
emission reductions from fuel quality and calibration, we see that cu
2α+1
4αcu−1 > co
2α+1
4αco−1 .
We conclude that e∗i,o > e
∗
i,u since cu < co.
15Setting si = 0 represents firms without control technology installed. Similarly, setting xi = 0
represents firms lacking or refusing to use cleaner fuels.
16Note: second order conditions are satisfied: ∂
2pii
∂x2i
= −2qα; ∂2pii
∂s2i
= −qβ; ∂2pii
∂δ2i
= −2qck. For the
remainder of our analysis we assume that input costs are sufficiently large such that co >
1
4α .
17To ensure that δ is bounded, we assume that cu ≥ α2 .
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4 Regulatory action
Any firm located in a non-attainment area is subjected to additional regulatory scrutiny
and oversight. SIPs can require firms to use different fuels, purchase emission offsets,
install RACT systems, or reduce emissions through facility-specific limits. Therefore, we
now turn our attention to mandatory emission reductions imposed by regulators.
Regulatory oversight or presence produces stationary source emission reductions (Raff
and Walter 2017). From a firm’s perspective, voluntary emission reductions can be profit
maximizing if a firm is concerned that regulators may take action against them.18 Based
on the cost of higher quality fuels and abatement technology installation and operation,
firms may also voluntarily decrease emissions to avoid costly interaction with the regulator.
However, a firm will only undertake voluntary emission-reducing efforts to the point of
mirroring regulator expectations (while the regulator is present). Therefore, we start by
identifying the socially optimal composition of clean strategies. We then identify the
regulator’s composition of these strategies based on options available and outlined by the
NAAQS.
4.1 Abatement efforts
While air pollution control is mandated by the CAA, the regulator must choose where
emission abatement occurs. However, the socially optimal outcome requires weighing the
benefits of production with damages from emissions. Therefore, we begin by aggregating
local firm profits and environmental damages, so social welfare within an area with N
firms is represented as:
SW =
N∑
i=1
(pii −Di)
where Di represents environmental damages stemming from firm i’s production and each
unit of emissions from firm i is assumed to produce γ damages.19
18Firms may be concerned with future regulatory actions, public appearance, or future retribution, e.g.,
being unable to secure an NSR permit from EPA to undertake modifications (Raff and Walter 2017).
19Similar to Fowlie and Muller (2019), we assume the environmental damages from emissions are linear
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Welfare maximization requires selecting a firm’s fuel quality, abatement technology
inputs, and operational calibration from emission sources. More explicitly, a planner
optimizes:20
max
xi,δi,si
SW =
N∑
i=1
[(
p− αx2i + δi (xi + ck)− (1 + δ2i )ck −
βs2i
2
)
q − (ek − si − δi − xi) qγ
]
(5)
We identify the social welfare-maximizing use of clean strategies (SW ) using equation
(5):
xSWi =
γ + ck (1 + 2γ)
4αck − 1 ; δ
SW
i =
γ + 2α (γ + ck)
4αck − 1 ; s
SW
i =
γ
β
;
eSWi = ek −
2γ (1 + α + ck) + ck (2α + 1)
4αck − 1 −
γ
β
(6)
Comparing (4) and (6) we find that:
Remark 2 In general, the welfare-maximizing outcome requires greater expenditures on
clean strategies, relative to a firm’s (voluntary) decision. As a result, the socially optimal
outcome requires firms to further decrease emissions.
This result is fairly obvious. The social planner would increase social welfare ideally
by increasing expenditures on clean strategies to decrease emissions (xSWi > x
∗
i ; δ
SW
i > δ
∗
i ;
sSWi > s
∗
i ). While this omits the cost of oversight, greater expenditures on clean strategies
would increase social welfare nonetheless. Evaluation of the CAA provides evidence of this
result (if we assume that the first abatement efforts taken are the more cost-effective).
EPA’s benefit-to-cost ratio from the CAA is estimated to be 4:1 or $52 billion in net
benefits from emission reductions (EPA 2009). While this result does not mirror the
regulator’s ideal outcome, it highlights the benefits of emission regulation over firms’
and additively separable by source for expositional ease.
20Not all stationary emission sources have abatement technology installed or access to cleaner fuel,
although the regulator can require the installation of RACT. Regardless, our interests at this point are in
the discrepancy between how regulators require a firm to operate and the firm’s own operating decisions.
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voluntary actions. However, the regulator’s method of emission reductions is much more
constrained. In the next sub-section, we examine how restrictions of the NAAQS influence
regulator behavior.
4.2 Reaching attainment
Regulatory action is permitted as part of the NAAQS designation process only until an
area meets ambient air quality standards, i.e., is designated as attainment (or mainte-
nance). Any location’s designation is determined by the following conditions:

eiq +
N−1∑
j 6=i
ejq +
M∑
l=1
al ≤ eR if in an attainment area
eiq +
N−1∑
j 6=i
ejq +
M∑
l=1
al > eR if in a non-attainment area

where al represents non-stationary source emissions from M sources and eR represents the
ambient air quality standard level of each NAAQS.
Non-attainment designation allows regulators to take action to restrict emissions.
While the majority of emissions come from non-stationary sources (Auffhammer et al.
2011), coal-fired power plants and other major stationary sources are often the first tar-
gets of SIPs (EPA 2018c; Raff and Walter 2018). We assume that regulators focus their
attention on reducing emissions from stationary sources using the methods discussed
above. Although there exists a limit to what emission reduction methods regulators can
require, we begin by examining regulator actions toward local stationary emission sources
to help reach attainment with the NAAQS. Regulators then have the following objective:
max
xi,δi,si
L =
n∑
i=1
[(
p− αx2i + δi (xi + ck)− (1 + δ2i )ck −
βs2i
2
)
− (ek − si − δi − xi) γ
]
q
−λ
(
n∑
i=1
[(ek − si − δi − xi) q]− eR
)
(7)
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For analytical ease, we assume that the regulator’s requirement of clean strategies
is proportional to a stationary source’s production, i.e., eR = erq, where er represents
firm emission reductions.21 We can identify the regulator’s use of clean strategies under
NAAQS restrictions using equation 7 (we denote the regulator’s decisions with “R”). This
yields:22
δRi =
(2α + β) co + (2α + 1) β (ek − er)
2β (1 + α + co) + 4αco − 1 ; s
R
i =
(4αco − 1) (ek − er)− (2α + 1) co
2β (1 + α + co) + 4αco − 1 ;
xRi =
(1− β) co + β (2co + 1) (ek − er)
2β (1 + α + co) + 4αco − 1 ; e
R
i = er
(8)
Comparing (4) and (8), we find that the regulator increases expenditures on clean
strategies to decrease emissions (xRi > x
∗
i ; δ
R
i > δ
∗
i ; s
R
i > s
∗
i ). This implies that the
regulator will require firms to further reduce emissions beyond voluntary efforts. Com-
paring (6) and (8), we find that the emission reduction is smaller than socially optimal
(xSWi > x
R
i ; δ
SW
i > δ
R
i ; s
SW
i > s
R
i ).
23 We assume that every firm has abatement technology
installed although we illustrate how regulators will move an area out of non-attainment.
Regardless, we conclude:
Remark 3 If stationary emission sources are required to use all clean strategies that are
cost effective, the regulatory requirements stemming from non-attainment would not be
socially optimal (but still exceed a firm’s voluntary efforts).
In the following sub-section, we examine how the lack of abatement technology at
regulated firms affects the regulator’s decision.
21Note that er is the cheapest abatement strategy from those available.
22λR =
(
γ(1−β)−(2α+1)β(γ+co)+β(4αco−1)(ek−er)−(β+2α)2γco
2(1+α+co)β+4αco−1
)
q
23We assume that β(ek−co)+(2β−1)γ+2β(αγ+αco+γco)+4αco(γ−ekβ)β(1−4αco) ≥ er because the regulator will not
require technology that is not cost effective. In the context of the NAAQS, additional scrutiny of non-
stationary sources is examined, e.g., outdoor wood-burning bans.
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4.3 Technology requirements
Requiring installation of abatement technology imposes a substantial financial burden
on the firm. Cost estimates for an SNCR exceed $10 million for equipment and site
requirements necessary for installation (EPA 2017a) (this figure does not include operating
costs). Regulators require firms in non-attainment areas to install at least RACT systems
(LAER for those making significant modifications). All technological requirements are
determined as part of the SIP, which can vary by area. Other factors, e.g., age of emission
source, type of modification, cost of technology, are considered as part of technological
requirement decisions.
The regulator must decide what abatement technology is required at each boiler given
the absence of abatement technology. The social welfare-maximizing approach requires
that technology with the greatest net benefits be installed. However, the regulator can
only require RACT which commands that the mandated technology be economically
feasible.
Let et represent the “reasonableness” of abatement technology (based on cost and
effectiveness), which is set by the regulator. Constraints make the regulator’s decision to
require firm i to install abatement technology, of type v, take the form:24
if et <
sSWiv qγ
Fiv +
β
2
(sSWiv )
2 and pii − Fiv > 0 then install v (9)
where Fiv is the installation cost of technology v for firm i.
An additional requirement of any SIP is the demonstration that attainment with the
NAAQS is possible given the prescribed regulatory actions. Therefore, the regulator must
choose the level of emission reductions through abatement technology, fuel, and calibration
24We differentiate by technology because of their substitutability, i.e., certain technologies can not be
used concurrently with other technologies. However, the regulator is unlikely to require a firm to install
two different technologies for a specific non-attainment designation. We expand on this distinction in a
later section.
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requirements such that:
nt∑
i
eiq +
no∑
j(6=i,k)
ejq +
nn∑
h( 6=j,i)
ehq +
M∑
l=1
al = eR +B (10)
where nt represents the minimum number of firms installing RACT, no represents the
number of firms without new technology, nn represents the number of firms with tech-
nology already installed (nt + no + nn = N), and B represents a buffer ensuring that the
ambient standard is sufficiently satisfied, which we refer to as “standard slack”. Figure 1
illustrates how ambient air quality changes in response to regulatory oversight.
Figure 1: Ambient air quality and “standard slack”
Non-attainment Maintenance t
eR
B
A
Ambient air concentration
Notes: The horizontal (and diagonal) dotted line represents the ambient air concentration of criteria air
pollutants for the relevant NAAQS over time. The path shows the resulting air quality improvements
(through aggregate emission decreases) from the execution of a SIP when an area is designated as non-
attainment. Once ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants are below the appropriate NAAQS (eR),
states can then request for the area to be re-designated as in attainment with the NAAQS (if approved,
an area obtains a “maintenance” designation which is used for 10 years). B measures the “standard
slack”, i.e., ambient air concentrations below the standard level.
Let n∗t denote the minimum number of firms requiring technology in order to satisfy
(10) when B = 0. The number of firms that install RACT as part of a SIP will exceed
20
n∗t for several reasons. First, the regulator would prefer to have additional slack (B > 0)
to account for variation of other emission sources. Second, the regulator is likely to use
conservative estimates regarding expected emission decreases from installed technology.
Third, the number of firms required to install RACT jumps discretely according to equa-
tion (9) as the “reasonableness” constraint for installing RACT (et) is lowered to satisfy
the ambient standard. As a result, the regulator must determine “reasonableness” such
that the number of firms required to install RACT (along with other SIP requirements)
satisfies the ambient standard, or equivalently:
min
er
nt s.t.
nt∑
i=1
eiq +
no∑
j=1
ejq +
nn∑
h=1
ehq +
M∑
l=1
al < eR +B (11)
Let et denote the RACT condition that satisfies (11) and let n
R
t represent the associated
number of firms installing RACT systems. nRt > n
∗
t and B > 0 because of discrete
changes in the number of firms due to RACT conditions. In contrast, the socially optimal
number of firms that should install abatement technology25 is determined solely on the
net benefits of available abatement technology.26 Since the socially optimal condition to
install abatement technology is stricter than the regulator’s (as crafted by the CAA), we
see that nSWt > n
R
t > n
∗
t . From this we conclude that:
Remark 4 The regulator will require installation of more abatement technology than is
required to meet the ambient air quality standard in non-attainment areas, but less than
is socially optimal.
We next examine how this process evolves in relation to exiting non-attainment, given
our clearer understanding of how regulators administer the installation and usage of abate-
ment technology.
25RACT is predicated on some technology satisfying the feasibility conditions outlined by the CAA.
We intentionally avoid using “RACT” in this context because this is stricter than the socially optimal
condition.
26A planner would require firms to install technology if Fiv +
β
2
(
sSWiv
)2
< sSWiv qγ; some firms could be
forced to shutdown due to the cost of the required technology.
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4.4 Leaving non-attainment
We can identify emission reductions that result from an area entering non-attainment
using the regulator’s decision to require abatement technology installation and the as-
sociated investment in clean strategies. We can identify the decrease in emissions from
entering non-attainment using equation (8) and technology installation (nSWt > n
R
t > n
∗
t ),
as:27
nRt∑
i=1
eRi q +
no∑
j=1
eRj q +
nn∑
h=1
eRh q +
M∑
l=1
al < eR +B (12)
An important observation of (12) is the level and management of emissions when an
area leaves non-attainment after attaining the relevant NAAQS. The regulator chooses
abatement efforts of firms (eRi ) in non-attainment and constructs appropriate slack be-
tween the ambient air quality standard and local ambient air quality. Management of
abatement efforts returns to the firm after an area attains the standard and exits non-
attainment.28 Firms will decrease abatement efforts relative to the regulator (see Re-
mark 3), which causes emissions to increase (eRi < e
∗
i ). A firm that increases emissions
contributes to degradation of ambient air quality, which can lead to re-designation as
non-attainment. Recall that in general, stationary sources account for a small minor-
ity of criteria air pollutant emissions in non-attainment areas. Additional slack has also
been created through inefficient diffusion of technology. Therefore, a firm’s emissions will
change according to:29
q∆ei = q(e
R
i − e∗i ) B (13)
The switch in management from regulator to firm is caused by the regulator leaving,
i.e., regulatory oversight reducing, after an area has attained the ambient air quality
27sRi = 0 for firms without abatement technology installed.
28Note that our analysis has focused on clean strategies where management can affect emissions.
29Our analysis focuses on how individual firms respond, however, we would expect the same increase
with multiple firms. Firms strategically increase emissions, so multiple sources can concurrently increase
emissions too.
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standard. Thus, ∆ei represents the effect of exiting non-attainment on firm emissions.
As shown, q∆ei > 0. This allows us to state the following:
Proposition 1 A stationary emission source located in a non-attainment area that has
sufficiently met ambient air quality standards (i.e., exiting non-attainment with some level
of “standard slack”), will increase its emissions, ceteris paribus.
This is an extension of Remark 3 applied to areas that have met ambient air qual-
ity standards. We expect that as the regulator transfers abatement efforts to the firm
emissions will increase.
Regulatory oversight changes firms’ aggregate emissions by influencing production. We
examine firm operations with and without direct regulatory oversight to identify emission
changes. Using the relationship between production and emissions in (2) highlights how
the regulator’s absence changes emissions, yielding:30
∆eit = ∆et −∆δit −∆(xit + sit) (14)
The parameters influencing firm emissions are: properties of the plant (ek), changes
in plant operations (∆δit), and (environmental) regulatory constraints (∆(xit + sit)). We
next move to testing empirically how firm emissions change in the absence of regulatory
oversight using these parameters.
5 Empirical analysis
This section lays out the primary empirical foundation of our study, which estimates the
effect of coal-fired power plant exit from non-attainment designation on NOx emissions and
emission rate at coal-fired power plants. First, we provide the identification strategy and
define our treatment. Second, we describe the data used and present sample summary
statistics. Third, we describe the estimating equation. Finally, we present results and
robustness checks.
30∆ei = e
∗
i − eRi = (ek − δ∗i − s∗i − x∗i )q − (ek − δRi − sRi − xRi )q = (∆ek −∆δi −∆xi −∆si)q
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5.1 Treatment definition and identification
Previous studies identify the effects of non-attainment designation on stationary source
emissions or ambient air quality based on facility or area entrance into non-attainment.
Most studies consider as “treated” all facilities after they enter into non-attainment for
the remainder of the sample period - even if the facilities exit non-attainment eventually
- because SIP-mandated emission reductions are expected to be permanent (EPA 2018c).
Rather than examine how emissions and emission rate change when facilities enter non-
attainment, we are interested in the opposite effect: the effect on emissions and emission
rate of exit from non-attainment, i.e, the effect on emissions of a significant and certain
decrease in regulatory oversight. Thus, we wish to examine if emission reductions made
by stationary sources while in non-attainment are indeed permanent, as required by EPA.
We define our generalized difference-in-differences (DD) estimator in the following way.
Boilers located in areas designated as non-attainment - for those designations that are
affected by NOx emissions (PM and ozone)
31 - at any point during our panel represent the
treatment group. The “post” period represents the time after the area that was previously
designated as non-attainment improves its ambient air quality to a level below the relevant
NAAQS and is re-designated as no longer being in non-attainment, i.e., maintenance or
attainment (this can happen at different times in our panel); this represents when an
area received treatment. If areas remain in non-attainment for the entirety of our panel,
then boilers in these areas never receive treatment. We thus leverage a one-time within-
boiler change out of non-attainment to estimate its effects on coal-fired power plant NOx
emissions and emission rate. We denote our treatment indicator Exit in the empirical
model specification.
Identification of these effects relies on an exogenous change in affected non-attainment
status. The change of status out of non-attainment is plausibly exogenous to NOx
emissions and emission rate for the average stationary source in each designated non-
attainment area because each stationary source’s emissions represent a small contribution
to ambient air concentrations of criteria pollutants for such a large geographic area. In-
31There were no non-attainment areas for nitrogen dioxide at any point in our sample.
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deed, mobile source emissions are responsible for the majority of criteria air pollutant
emissions (Auffhammer et al. 2011). Further, EPA National Emissions Inventory (NEI)
data show that in 2011 only 4% of NOx emissions in New England were from electric
utilities. Previous studies have also treated non-attainment designation as exogenous to
facility emissions (Greenstone 2003; Bi 2017; Gibson 2018). Further, we lag our treatment
indicator by one year to allow utility managers time to respond to changes in NAAQS des-
ignation. Thus, boiler exit from non-attainment is exogenous given the separation in time
between lagged treatment and current boiler level emissions. Finally, we focus exclusively
on NOx emissions and emission rate due to the potential endogeneity concerns of other
pollutants found in our data, e.g., SO2 emissions and SO2 non-attainment designation.
For SO2 in particular, the ambient air concentration of an area is more significantly im-
pacted by electric utility emissions (NEI data show that more than 50% of SO2 emissions
are from electric utilities). Thus, our identification carefully considers which pollutants
and air quality standards to examine to ensure the exogeneity of treatment.
We test further that non-attainment designation is exogenous and thus, that we have
identified correctly the effects of exit from non-attainment on NOx emissions and emis-
sion rate by examining if coal-fired power plant emissions affect the probability of non-
attainment designation. Our treatment is endogenous if past period coal-fired power plant
NOx emissions can predict when an area is designated as non-attainment for PM or ozone.
We test this by estimating an equation where NOx-affected non-attainment designation is
the dependent variable and the regressors are one-year lagged NOx emissions (and other
lagged controls, as described below) using OLS. The coefficient for lagged NOx emis-
sions is not statistically significant (p=0.784), which means that previous year coal-fired
power plant NOx emissions do not affect the probability that an area is designated as
non-attainment for either PM or ozone. Collectively, we are confident that our treatment
is exogenous and that its effects are identified correctly.
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5.2 Data
We use EPA’s Air Markets Program Database (AMPD) as our primary data source. The
AMPD contains information on several measures for regulated facilities that burn fossil
fuels, e.g., coal, and that serve a generator greater than 25 MW, from 1980-present; this
includes nearly every coal-fired electric utility in the United States. The AMPD includes
individual boiler level emissions of NOx (measured in tons) and heat input (measured in
MMBtu), which is necessary for the calculation of NOx emission rate.
32 The AMPD also
contains information on installed pollution control technologies at each boiler, including
the year of installation. Finally, the AMPD includes data on other facility and boiler
level characteristics such as operating capacity, total electrical generation, and federal
programs under which each boiler is regulated.
Figure 2: NOx emission trends
Notes: Trends are mean boiler level NOx emissions and emission rate by year. Emissions are measured
in tons and rates are measured in pounds per MMBtu.
Figure 2 shows mean boiler level trends of NOx emissions and emission rate during
32NOx emission rate is the amount of NOx emitted per unit of energy produced. We calculate this as
pounds of NOx emissions/heat input.
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our sample period. It is evident from this time series that the two measures trend very
closely. Additionally, there is a steady downward emission trend in this sector during the
past two decades. This highlights the importance of controlling for time trends and other
regulatory programs that have potentially contributed to this decline in our analysis.
Figure 3: NOx emission trends by boiler age
Notes: Trends are mean boiler level NOx emission rates by boiler age, measured in pounds per MMBtu.
Groups are determined by age quartiles, e.g., 0-25 percentile.
Figure 3 presents a time trend of mean boiler level emission rates by boiler age, with
boilers grouped into four categories based on age quartiles. As represented above, we
expect emission rates to be higher for those boilers that are older; Figure 3 confirms this
assertion. We see that for boilers in the fourth age quartile, i.e., 75-100 percentile, emission
rates are consistently higher than those for boilers in the other three age quartiles.33 We
perform this same exercise but condition emissions on installation date of NOx abatement
technology, i.e., “birth” of the boiler is at time of technology installation rather than initial
33We have relatively few observations for fourth quartile boilers for years prior to 2000 (0 in 1995 and
1996). The oldest boiler in our sample is 46 years old in 1995 and the fourth age quartile is 48 years old
and above.
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construction. Time series results for this exercise are nearly identical to those presented
in Figure 3.
We built our panel by collecting all boiler level data available in the AMPD through
2016. We then eliminated observations from 1980-1990 because data are only available
in five-year increments until 1995. Next, we retained only those boilers that burn coal
as the primary fuel and were categorized as “Electric Utility”, “Cogeneration”, or “Small
Power Producer”.34 Several boilers throughout our panel either shut down, came on-
line, or switched fuel (most to natural gas); we do not include in our analysis boiler-year
observations where the boiler burns fuel other than coal or is not operating. The final
analysis dataset is an unbalanced panel of coal-fired power plant boiler-years from 1995-
2016. The unbalanced nature of our panel is not problematic because attrition is low
and not endogenously determined. Indeed, we estimate a specification with only those
boilers that operated during the entirety of our panel as coal-fired units, i.e., our panel is
perfectly balanced. Empirical results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
presented below.
It is possible during our sample period for areas to exit non-attainment designation
and then re-enter several years later. This can happen in one of two ways: (1) ambient
air concentrations of criteria air pollutants in the area rise above the relevant NAAQS
after re-designation (perhaps due to rising emissions as a result of decreased regulatory
oversight) or (2) EPA tightens, i.e., lowers, the NAAQS to a level below the ambient
air concentration of an area for that pollutant. As a specific example within our sample
period, Floyd County (IN)35 was designated as non-attainment for ozone from 1995-
2000. In 2001, the ambient air concentration of ozone in the county reached attainment
levels and the area was re-designated as maintenance, i.e., is treated in our specification.
However, in 2004 EPA promulgated new ozone standards which decreased the ambient
level of ozone necessary to be designated as non-attainment. As a result, Floyd County
34We also estimate our primary regression specification for all facilities that burn coal as fuel, including
those that do not generate electricity, e.g., pulp and paper mills. Empirical results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to those presented below.
35R. Gallagher Generating Station, a 150 MW coal-fired power plant, is located in this county.
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was re-designated as non-attainment under the new standards. Because our identification
relies on a one-time exogenous shock out of non-attainment, we would miss (for boilers
such as this) the second “shock” that occurred when areas go from non-attainment to
maintenance and back into non-attainment.36 We correct for this potential measurement
error by including twice in our panel, i.e., data for the full 22 years, those boilers that
exited non-attainment twice. Thus, we are able to witness the change in emissions and
emission rate as a result of each of the two treatments for these boilers.37
Our use of the AMPD is preferred to other data sources used to estimate the effects
of non-attainment on emissions or ambient air quality. First, previous studies have used
EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) to estimate these effects (Greenstone 2002; Bi 2017;
Gibson 2018). However, TRI data capture emissions from only regulated facilities that
emit a certain amount of toxic pollutants necessary for TRI reporting. Of the criteria
air pollutants regulated by the NAAQS, only lead and ozone are TRI chemicals. Second,
other studies examine the effects of non-attainment on the ambient air quality of an area
using EPA’s Air Quality System (AQS), not emissions (Greenstone 2004; Auffhammer et
al. 2009). AQS data do not allow for facility (boiler) level analysis and so use of these
data does not allow an examination of how stationary source emissions change when not
subjected to regulatory oversight.
We use EPA’s Green Book for information about non-attainment designation (EPA
2017b). The Green Book contains non-attainment status of six criteria pollutants regu-
lated by the NAAQS at the county level for the United States between 1992 and 2016.
Table 1 depicts if ambient air concentrations of the six criteria air pollutants are affected
by NOx emissions.
Finally, we use the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) yearly scorecards (1995-
2016) to account for a state’s level of environmental concern of its citizens. This variable
serves as a proxy for the level of regulatory stringency placed on regulated facilities in
individual states. Each year, the LCV publishes a scorecard that ranks the level of pro-
36There are no areas in our dataset that exit non-attainment three or more times.
37Estimation results are qualitatively and quantitatvely similar if we only estimate the effects based on
the first exit from non-attainment.
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environmentalism of each state’s congressional delegation. The measure is calculated
using each state’s representatives’ voting records on key pieces of environmentally related
legislation. Table 2 provides statistical summaries for measures used in the analysis.
Table 2: Sample summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
NOx emissions (logged tons) 7.256 1.459 -6.908 11.38
NOx emission rate (logged lbs/MMBtu) -1.158 0.670 -6.725 3.098
Treatment
NOx-affected non-attainment exit (one-year lag) 0.173 0.378 0 1
Boiler level controls
Total electrical generation (GW-h) 2003 1833 0 13,900
Maximum capacity (MW) 337.1 309.2 0.099 6283
Operating time (hours) 6564 2181 0 8784
House LCV score (0-100) 39.80 18.40 0 100
Regulatory program controls
CAA Title IV Acid Rain Program 0.938 0.242 0 1
Clean Air Interstate Rule (NOx) 0.263 0.440 0 1
SIP NOx Program 0.005 0.070 0 1
Cross-State Air Pollution NOx Program 0.058 0.233 0 1
NOx Budget Program 0.189 0.392 0 1
Notes: Summary statistics are at the boiler-year level. NOx-affected non-attainment exit indicates years
following exit from non-attainment for coal-fired boilers. Regulatory program dummies indicate that a
boiler is regulated under that program in a given year.
Most important, 17% of boiler-year observations receive the treatment described in
the previous sub-section. Specifically, these boiler-years were previously located in coun-
ties designated as non-attainment but then ambient air concentrations of PM or ozone
improved and the county exited non-attainment. Table 2 shows considerable variation in
most measures, including our treatment indicator. Finally, minimum values of the depen-
dent variables (and of some controls) highlight the importance of the identified control
factors, especially operating time of each boiler. Some boiler-year observations emitted
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less than one ton of NOx (as identified by log-transformed values less than zero). Thus,
controlling for the amount of time that these boilers operated appears imperative.
5.3 Estimating equation
Let Yift represent NOx emissions (measured in tons) or emission rate (measured in lbs/MMBtu)
of coal-fired power plant boiler i at facility f in year t. Using equation (14) as a guide,
we estimate the following generalized DD specification using the definiton of treatment
described in the previous sub-section:
ln(Yift) = ψi + X
′
iftΠ + νrt + βExitift−1 + R′iftΨ + ift (15)
where ψi represents boiler fixed effects, which control for boiler specific features that do
not change over time. Xift is a vector containing a set of boiler level operation and control
variables, which include total electrical generation, maximum capacity, operating time,
and House LCV score. These time-varying factors control for variation in boiler level
characteristics that impact NOx emissions and emission rate. The remaining variables
represent time or regulatory constraints. νrt are EPA region by year fixed effects, which
control for year-specific variation in NAAQS implementation across EPA regions, e.g.,
variation driven by differences in regional office leadership. Exitift−1 is the DD indicator
which represents exit from PM or ozone non-attainment designation, lagged one year.38
We lag this measure to allow firm managers time to respond to the change in regulatory
requirements after exiting non-attainment. (We examine varying lag lengths below.) Fi-
nally, Rift is a vector that consists of a series of dummies that indicate whether boiler i
at facility f in year t is subjected to the requirements of regulatory programs other than
the NAAQS. These dummies help us better isolate the effects of exiting non-attainment
on NOx emissions and emission rate at coal-fired power plants because the programs are
intended to decrease emissions and improve ambient air quality, similar to the NAAQS.
38We also consider a specification where counties in the 13 state Ozone Transport Region (OTR) are
considered in non-attainment for the entirety of our panel (Sheriff et al. 2019) and thus, OTR counties
do not ever exit non-attainment. Results from this specification are nearly identical to those presented
below.
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Thus, exclusion of these programmatic dummies would result in the analysis attributing
emission decreases/increases at coal-fired power plant boilers from other programs to the
NAAQS. Rift contains dummies for the CAA Title IV Acid Rain Program (ARP), Clean
Air Interstate Rule, SIP NOx Program, Cross-State Air Pollution NOx Program, and the
NOx Budget Program.
39 Finally, ift is the exogenous error term. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level which is the level of identifying variation.40
5.4 Results
Results for the estimation of equation (15) are tabulated in Table 3. We include results for
three model specifications to assess the robustness of our results based on control variables
included in the analysis. Columns two and three present results from the estimation of
the parsimonious model, which includes only the treatment regressor and boiler and year
by region fixed effects. Without any boiler level or programmatic controls, we still see an
increase of nearly 12% in coal-fired power plant boiler emissions when the direct regulatory
oversight on non-attainment is eliminated. The lack of statistical significance for NOx
emission rate in this model specification perhaps highlights the importance of adding
operating time and production variables as controls. Columns four and five add boiler
level controls and columns six and seven add regulatory program controls. We focus our
discussion of the results on those from the full model, which includes all possible controls
on the right-hand side (columns six and seven); results from this specification are very
similar to those when we include only boiler level controls. Column six presents results
for the estimation where logged NOx emissions is the dependent variable. The effects of
exiting NOx-affected non-attainment designation are presented as semi-elasticities because
the outcome is log-transformed. We find that boilers regulated under non-attainment SIPs
39An important regulatory program that was implemented during our sample period that is not included
in Rift is the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) [2011 announcement and 2015 implementation].
Coal-fired boilers over 25 MW were regulated under MATS requirements. Because AMPD data contain
information for all electric utility boilers that are greater than 25 MW, every boiler in our sample was
regulated under the MATS. Thus, MATS regulation is subsumed into the EPA region by year fixed effects.
40Clustering standard errors at the boiler level produces results that are identical to those presented
below.
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increase NOx emissions by 16% one year after exiting non-attainment and while regulated
under a maintenance plan. To put this value into greater context, this increase is over
486 additional tons of NOx emitted at the average boiler in our sample.
Table 3: Fixed effects estimation results for exit from non-attainment
Dependent variable
Variable Emissions Rate Emissions Rate Emissions Rate
Treatment
NOx-affected non-attainment 0.117* 0.047 0.173*** 0.091** 0.161*** 0.088**
exit (one-year lag) (0.060) (0.042) (0.050) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045)
Boiler-level controls
Total electrical generation -0.046 0.039* -0.047 0.038*
(TW-h) (0.040) (0.020) (0.039) (0.020)
Maximum capacity of boiler 0.033 -0.008 0.034 -0.009
(GW) (0.089) (0.110) (0.090) (0.109)
Operating time (days) 0.069*** -0.0007*** 0.069*** -0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
House LCV score (0-100) 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Regulatory program controls
CAA Title IV Acid Rain Program 0.020 -0.033
(0.108) (0.084)
Clean Air Interstate Rule (NOx) 0.017 0.070
(0.059) (0.047)
SIP NOx Program -0.437*** -0.291
(0.125) (0.178)
Cross-State Air Pollution NOx 0.097 0.054
Program (0.080) (0.080)
NOx Budget Program -0.101* -0.023
(0.057) (0.060)
Observations 23,524 23,355 14,596 14,592 14,596 14,592
Number of boilers 1,334 1,326 1,095 1,096 1,095 1,096
Boiler FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year#EPA Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered at the county level, which is the level of identifying
variation, and located in parentheses. There are 396 counties (clusters) with coal-fired power plant boilers in the panel.
Dependent variables are log-transformed. NOx-affected non-attainment exit indicates years following exit from non-
attainment for coal-fired boilers. Regulatory program dummies indicate that a boiler is regulated under that program in
a given year.
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We also estimate the effect of exit from non-attainment on NOx emission rates. This
rate is measured in pounds per million British Thermal Units (lbs/MMBtu) and allows
us to examine emissions per amount of energy produced at each boiler. Although we
control above for operating time and electrical generation, using NOx emission rate as our
outcome allows us to examine further how utilities respond when exiting non-attainment.
For example, if boiler level emissions increase once counties exit non-attainment (as shown
above), this may be the result of managers ramping up each boiler and producing more
electricity rather than managers making a conscious decision to, e.g., under-utilize abate-
ment technology due to decreased regulatory presence. Results presented in column seven
of Table 3 show that this hypothetical is not the case: exit from non-attainment increases
boiler level NOx emission rates by 9%.
These results support the following conclusions. Utility managers increase boiler level
NOx emissions in general when the area that each boiler is located within exogenously
exits out of non-attainment designation. Our examination of emission rate as the outcome
provides evidence that this is not simply the result of managers running boilers harder
and producing more electrical output, which would certainly increase emissions. We find
that emissions per unit of output also increase when the additional regulatory stringency
and oversight of non-attainment is reduced. These results provide initial evidence that
emission decreases mandated within SIPs are not permanent. Further, results suggest
that emission increases may be the result of under-utilization of clean strategies present
when in non-attainment. We examine this possibility further in section 6.
5.5 Sensitivity analysis
In this sub-section we assess the robustness of our results to changes in regression speci-
fication and analysis sample. We first examine varying lag length of treatment. We lag
treatment by one year in our primary regression specification to allow utility managers
time to respond to the decrease in regulatory oversight associated with exit from non-
attainment. However, it is possible that the response may not be immediate. Managers
could take time to change their operations, as learning about the new regulatory environ-
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ment occurs in a period longer than one year (Maniloff 2019). As a result, we re-estimate
equation (15) with treatment now lagged by three and five years to examine manager
behavior. Results for these alternative specifications are tabulated in Table 4. Columns
two and three present results for a three-year treatment lag and columns four and five
present results for a five-year treatment lag. Empirical results are similar for both alter-
native specifications to those presented in the full model of Table 3. Both NOx emissions
and emission rate increase significantly after exit from non-attainment, even with longer
lag periods. These results indicate that changes in emissions and emission rate happen
almost immediately after regulatory oversight is decreased and these increases remain into
the future. Utility managers are aware of the change in oversight after only one year and
increase emissions accordingly.
Table 4: Fixed effects estimation results for exit from non-attainment:
Varying lag length
Dependent variable
Variable Emissions Rate Emissions Rate
NOx-affected non-attainment 0.178*** 0.125***
exit (three-year lag) (0.050) (0.045)
NOx-affected non-attainment 0.157** 0.119**
exit (five-year lag) (0.063) (0.060)
Observations 14,483 14,477 14,247 14,242
Number of boilers 1,095 1,096 1,095 1,096
Boiler-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulatory program controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Boiler FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year#EPA Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered at the county level
and located in parentheses. Dependent variables are log-transformed. NOx-affected
non-attainment exit indicates years following exit from non-attainment for coal-fired
boilers.
We also examine the robustness of the primary estimation results to changes in analysis
sample. To do so, we exclude from the analysis those boilers that never experienced the
increased regulatory oversight of non-attainment designation. Thus, our control group
is now non-attainment boilers that have not exited non-attainment. This control group
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may be more appropriate because boilers that have never been in non-attainment may
be a poor counterfactual for boilers that are subjected to significantly higher regulatory
oversight. For this analysis then, identification rests solely on the timing of treatment.
Results from the estimation of equation (15) with this sub-sample are presented in Table
5. Results are nearly identical to those presented in Table 3. We see that no matter the
control group, exogenous exit from non-attainment significantly increases NOx emissions
and emission rate.
Table 5: Fixed effects estimation results for exit
from non-attainment: Alternative sample
Dependent variable
Variable Emissions Rate
NOx-affected non-attainment 0.161*** 0.115**
exit (one-year lag) (0.056) (0.051)
Observations 7,363 7,360
Number of boilers 565 566
Boiler-level controls Yes Yes
Regulatory program controls Yes Yes
Boiler FE Yes Yes
Year#EPA Region FE Yes Yes
Notes: *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard er-
rors clustered at the county level and located in parenthe-
ses. Dependent variables are log-transformed. NOx-affected
non-attainment exit indicates years following exit from non-
attainment for coal-fired boilers. Analysis sample is boilers
located in counties that were at one point designated as non-
attainment. Control group is boilers that never exit non-
attainment during our sample period, i.e., non-attainment
boilers that never receive treatment.
6 Mechanisms
We discuss in this section the mechanisms through which coal-fired power plants in-
crease post non-attainment emissions. As shown, the absence of direct regulatory over-
sight incentivizes utility managers to increase emissions above the non-attainment level.
“Standard slack” created by the emission reductions of non-attainment allows firms the
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opportunity to minimize costs and thus increase emissions; Figure 4 illustrates this sce-
nario.
Figure 4: Emission changes in the presence of “standard slack”
Non-attainment Maintenance t
eR
B
∆ei
A
Ambient air concentration
Notes: The horizontal (and diagonal) dotted line represents the ambient air concentration of criteria air
pollutants for the relevant NAAQS over time. The path shows the resulting air quality improvements
(through aggregate emission decreases) from the execution of a SIP when an area is designated as non-
attainment. Once ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants are below the appropriate NAAQS (eR),
states can then request for the area to be re-designated as in attainment with the NAAQS (if approved,
an area obtains a “maintenance” designation which is used for 10 years). B measures the “standard
slack”, i.e., ambient air concentrations below the standard level. ∆ei represents the increase in emissions
at stationary sources that occur once an area is no longer designated as non-attainment, i.e., direct
regulatory oversight is absent.
We first examine local emission reductions created by the regulator through additional
oversight and the requirements of SIPs. Recall that local emissions in an area that has
met ambient air quality standards are:
nt∑
i=1
(ek − si − δi − xi) q +
no∑
j=1
(ek − δi − xi) q +
nn∑
h=1
(ek − si − δi − xi) q +
M∑
l=1
al < eR +B
(16)
Ambient air quality “standard slack” allows local emission sources to increase emissions if
37
it reduces their costs. All else equal, firms will attempt to find cost savings if q∆ei  B.
However, the methods by which emission increases occur may differ. Equation (16) reveals
three ways that the typical firm can increase emissions: abatement technology usage,
quality of inputs, or re-calibration. Comparing each firm’s emissions in (16) to the firm’s
decision (without increased regulatory oversight) from (4), the firm’s cost-minimizing and
emission increasing options can be identified. Explicitly, we obtain q∆ei = (ek − ∆δi −
∆si − ∆xi)q. The following sub-sections examine how operational changes lead a profit
maximizing firm to increase emissions after exiting non-attainment. Fuel type and clean
technology affect the calibration of other equipment, therefore we focus on the primary
effects of fuel and technology.
6.1 Abatement technology
We first examine how firms leaving non-attainment use the abatement technology required
as part of non-attainment designation.
Theoretical foundation. Many forms of abatement technology require significant
input costs to operate effectively. The use of reagents and catalysts, e.g., ammonia,
increases operating costs because of higher combustion (fuel) requirements and the cost
of the inputs themselves. A profit maximizing firm will reduce expenditures in abatement
technology; see Remark (3). As a result, the quantity of reagent used by the firm will
deviate from the socially optimal amount required by the regulator, i.e., sRi > s
∗
i , and by
extension, q(sRi −s∗i ) > 0. In the context of non-attainment, this gives q∆si > 0. To state
formally:
Proposition 2 A profit-maximizing stationary emission source will decrease the use of
abatement technology inputs when exiting non-attainment, which will increase emissions.
Emission increases are directly related to firm profit. However, the type of abatement
technology installed at each boiler also impacts the firm’s options. In general, RACT
requirements do not contain prescribed equipment or technologies that must be used.
This lack of specification results in considerable heterogeneity in the installed abatement
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technology across coal-fired boilers in non-attainment areas. For example, SCR/SNCR
have higher installation and operation costs relative to low NOx burners (LNB) or over-
fire air systems (OFA). Of interest is the firm’s ability to adjust installed technology
effectiveness. For example, LNB/OFA do not have reoccurring operating costs, while
SCR/SNCR require continuous purchase of reagents and catalysts, e.g., ammonia (and
also additional heat requirements).41
NOx emission reductions from SCR (75-85%) or SNCR (40-60%) are more effective
than LNB (35-55%) or OFA (20-30%) (Xiong et al. 2016). However, input requirements of
SCR/SNCR relative to LNB/OFA are significant and include additional heat requirements
and catalytic material (Van Caneghem et al. 2016). This highlights benefit and cost
differences in RACT systems. As a result, regulators may require different abatement
technologies when deciding NOx RACT as part of SIPs. Input expenditures for abatement
technology will differ considerably depending on the type; this limits firm options and
affects post non-attainment emissions.
As a specific example, let two abatement technologies exist, v and w, where v rep-
resents technology with input requirements and w represents technology without input
requirements (or only unavoidable input requirements, e.g., maintenance). The type of
technology installed at each boiler affects the regulator’s ability to adjust firm expendi-
tures. Specifically, sRiw = s¯iw, for technology without input requirements, and s
R
iv > s¯iv for
technology with input requirements, as the regulator will require additional expenditure
above the minimum. Formally:
Proposition 3 A profit maximizing stationary emission source with abatement technol-
ogy that requires costly inputs will decrease its use of these inputs (abatement technology)
and increase emissions, relative to firms without abatement technology input requirements,
in the absence of direct regulatory oversight.
This finding highlights the fact that the type of abatement technology installed at
41Reagent costs are considerable; purchase of ammonia to use with SCR/SNCR can cost millions of
dollars per year for a single boiler. As anecdotal evidence, we discussed operations with the operator of a
regulated coal-fired power plant in the midwest with SCR technology and ammonia costs for this boiler
were between $3 and $5 million per year.
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each boiler affects its management and post non-attainment usage. Importantly, the
cost structure of abatement technology creates incentives rarely (if ever) discussed. From
the regulator’s perspective, as long as air quality standards are maintained the firm is
effectively managing its abatement technology. Efficiency losses are possible after the
costly installation of abatement technology due to the firm’s profit motive, which results
in emission increases because of the reduction in usage of abatement technology inputs.
Empirical examination. We test empirically if emission increases at boilers exiting
non-attainment are the result of utility managers under-utilizing abatement technology.
Specifically, we show above that managers will minimize input costs associated with cer-
tain technologies, e.g., SCR/SNCR, in the absence of direct regulatory oversight; this
results in increased emissions. To test this assertion, we first restrict the sample to those
boilers located in a county that was designated as non-attainment at some point during
our sample period. We restrict the sample to these boilers because this allows us to exam-
ine abatement technology installed as a result of the technological requirements of SIPs,
rather than manager decisions. We use data on the type and install date of abatement
technology at each boiler to examine the differential effects. We re-estimate equation (15)
for two sub-samples depending on the type of abatement technology installed at each
boiler. First, we estimate the effects of exiting non-attainment on NOx emissions and
emission rate for those boilers with technologies requiring reagents, which represent a
substantial input cost to technological operation. This sub-sample includes boilers that
installed SCR, SNCR, or ammonia injection systems as a result of non-attainment desig-
nation. This sub-sample represents boilers with the potential to have varying success at
decreasing emissions depending on input usage and thus, we expect emission increases at
these boilers after exiting non-attainment. Second, we estimate the same effects for boilers
with technology that does not require reagents, i.e., input costs. These boilers have fuel
re-burning, LNB, or OFA systems installed when in non-attainment. This sub-sample
represents boilers with technologies that are essentially “set it and forget it”; installa-
tion of these technologies is the primary cost and thus, we expect emissions to remain
unchanged at these boilers when direct regulatory oversight is absent.
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Results for the re-estimation of equation (15) for sub-samples based on technology
type are tabulated in Table 6. Panel A presents results for technologies that require input
costs and Panel B presents results for technologies that do not require input costs. The
differential effects of non-attainment exit on NOx emissions by technology type are evi-
dent. Boilers with abatement technology that requires substantial input costs are driving
the significant increase in emissions after exiting non-attainment. These boilers increase
emissions by 17% in the year following county exit from non-attainment. Conversely, boil-
ers with technology installed during non-attainment that do not require reagents see no
change in emissions after treatment. Results for NOx emission rate are similar. Emission
rate increases after the exit from non-attainment are 11.5%. Like overall NOx emissions,
boilers with no necessary inputs in their abatement technology do not see any change in
emission rates after non-attainment exit.
Table 6: Differential effects of non-attainment exit by abatement technology type
Panel A: Reagent technology Panel B: Non-reagent technology
Variable Emissions Rate Emissions Rate
NOx-affected non-attainment 0.170** 0.115* 0.067 0.007
exit (one-year lag) (0.067) (0.066) (0.056) (0.036)
Observations 2,971 2,970 4,392 4,390
Number of boilers 271 271 499 500
Boiler-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulatory program controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Boiler FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year#EPA Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered at the county level and located in
parentheses. Dependent variables are log-transformed. NOx-affected non-attainment exit indicates years
following exit from non-attainment for coal-fired boilers. Analysis sample is boilers located in counties
that were at one point designated as non-attainment and installed capture technology as part of RACT
requirements. Panel A presents estimation results for the sub-sample of boilers with capture technology that
requires substantial variable costs in the form of reagents. The technologies are SCR, SNCR, and ammonia
injection. Panel B presents results for those boilers with technologies that do not require reagents. These
technologies are fuel re-burning, LNB, and OFA.
This set of results confirms empirically that a driving mechanism behind NOx emis-
sions and emission rate increases at boilers exiting non-attainment is the under-utilization
of abatement technology. We find that boilers with technology with considerable input
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costs increase emissions after non-attainment exit but those without input costs do not.
Thus, profit maximizing utility managers choose to minimize input costs in the pro-
duction process by purchasing (and using) less reagents. This in turn increases NOx
emissions and emission rate at these boilers. Alternatively, managers of boilers with no
technological input costs do not have the option to cut costs in the operation of these tech-
nologies. Decreased regulatory oversight is no different than heightened oversight during
non-attainment for these boilers. Thus, managers do not have the option to under-utilize
technologies and emissions remain unchanged.
6.2 Fuel
Because increased regulatory oversight has important implications for the quality of fuel
used, we next examine input decisions made by utility managers.
Theoretical foundation. The three primary types of coal used at electrical boilers
in the United States are bituminous, sub-bituminous, and lignite.42 Energy Information
Administration (EIA) data show that bituminous coal costs roughly four times more
per short ton than sub-bituminous and lignite coal.43 This price differential is because
bituminous coal is of higher quality; this fuel has generally a higher heat content and a
lower ash content than sub-bituminous and lignite coal, meaning that it burns hotter and
there is less residual after burning. Firms might not explicitly seek lower quality inputs,
but cost minimization decisions can come into play.
The higher ash content of lower quality coal increases operating costs through byprod-
uct disposal, additional input requirements, and maintenance, despite decreased costs of
acquiring this fuel type. While contents of byproducts like nitrogen may be fairly con-
sistent between coal types, the quantity of coal required for the same level of production
can vary considerably due to heat value. Therefore, the quantity of fuel acquired and
consumed will vary considerably due to its heat content, even though the presence of
certain byproducts are consistent across fuel types.
42A fourth coal type, anthracite, is used at less than one percent of boilers.
43https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/table31.pdf
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Utility boiler presence in a non-attainment area will encourage fuel optimization and
the use of “better” coal because regulators often require firms to use better inputs (when
available and feasible) as part of emission reduction requirements of SIPs. The acquisition
and use of these higher quality inputs (either in terms of better heat content or lower ash
content) increases operating costs for regulated firms. We examine how operations differ
once regulatory oversight is reduced.
Similar to abatement technology, the type of inputs required for operation (e.g., fuel,
technological reagent) affect the firm’s operating expenditures considerably. We expect
that xRi > 0 for fuel with higher combustion properties or lower ash content. As before, the
regulator will require additional expenditures above the minimum (or the cost-minimizing
level) for cleaner inputs (in this case fuel) to contribute to emission reductions necessary
to achieve attainment with the NAAQS. The firm acting with its own discretion, i.e.,
without direct regulatory oversight, would avoid additional input expenses (xRi > x
∗
i = 0)
to maximize profits; see Remark (3). Thus, q∆xi > 0 in the context of non-attainment.
To state formally:
Proposition 4 A profit maximizing stationary emission source that uses costly (and
“cleaner”) fuels while in non-attainment will decrease its use of these fuels in the ab-
sence of direct regulatory oversight, which increases emissions.
As before, the use of cleaner fuels decreases the firm’s profit. Thus, exiting non-
attainment incentivizes the firm to reduce usage of cleaner fuels which will increase its
profit, but also its emissions.
Empirical examination. We test empirically the assertion that utility managers
switch to lower quality coal, i.e., lower heat content or higher ash content, once direct
regulatory oversight is substantially reduced. We re-estimate equation (15) but examine
coal shipments to regulated facilities rather than NOx emissions or emission rate as our
outcome. We use coal acquisition data from the EIA 906 and 923 forms for the duration of
our panel.44 The analysis is now at the facility-year level because EIA coal acquisition data
44We graciously thank Ian Lange for help in securing these data.
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are only available at the facility (not boiler) level. Our analysis considers two dependent
variables of interest: (1) type of coal acquired45 and (2) qualities of the coal acquired. We
examine each in turn.
First, we examine as our outcome the amount of bituminous coal delivered to each
facility in each year. As mentioned, bituminous coal is the highest quality coal type
and typically has the highest heat content and lowest ash content of the three primary
coal types. We remove anthracite coal shipments from the analysis (which represent only
0.1% of yearly shipments). Thus, re-estimation of equation (15) with bituminous coal
shipments as the outcome will show the relationship between exit from non-attainment
and acquisition of the highest quality input for coal-fired power plants. We again focus on
facilities that were at one point in non-attainment during our sample period. Estimation
results are presented in the second column of Table 7 and show that exit from non-
attainment leads to a significant decrease in bituminous coal acquisition. We interpret a
negative coefficient on the treatment indicator as evidence of utility managers switching
to lower quality fuel one year after the increased regulatory oversight of non-attainment
designation is reduced. The size of the effect is substantial: non-attainment exit leads
to a roughly 313,000 ton decrease of bituminous coal acquired by treated facilities in
the following year. We interpret this large negative relationship in two ways. First, the
analysis is at the facility level. Facilities that contain multiple boilers consume large
amounts of coal so shipments are substantial. Second, the coefficient value is roughly
55% of the mean facility-year shipment. Most facilities acquire fuel from a relatively
small number of mines due to the nature of coal purchase contracts. Thus, any change
in fuel acquisition is likely to be a large one, with facilities purchasing coal from entirely
different mines or regions of the country.
Second, we estimate as a dependent variable an indicator for “poor coal” in a manner
identical to that above using OLS. This analysis examines if firms acquire cheaper coal
(and thus of lower quality) - in addition to a different type - once regulatory oversight
45We consider coal shipments a reasonable proxy for fuel usage or utility manager input choice. Again
anecdotally, our conversations with coal plant operators confirmed that coal acquisitions are typically
burned first, i.e., coal is taken straight from trains to the boiler.
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subsides. We define our indicator of poor coal using the heat content and ash content
of coal acquisitions by regulated facilities. Our measure indicates if the average yearly
shipment of coal to facilities has ash content above the median value for lignite and sub-
bituminous coal and heat content below the median value for lignite and sub-bituminous
coal. The third column of Table 7 presents results of this estimation. Similar to coal
type, we see that once facilities exit non-attainment managers acquire lower quality fuel.
The effect of exiting non-attainment on poor coal acquisition is statistically significant
but practically small with an effect size of only 0.9 percentage points.
Table 7: Fixed effects estimation results for exit from non-attainment:
Input usage
Dependent variable
Variable Bituminous coal amount 1(Poor coal)
NOx-affected non-attainment -313.6*** 0.009*
exit (one-year lag) (83.88) (0.005)
Observations 5,405 5,405
Number of facilities 408 408
Facility level controls Yes Yes
Regulatory program controls Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes
Year#EPA Region FE Yes Yes
Notes: *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered at the county
level and located in parentheses. Dependent variables are thousands of tons of
bituminous coal shipments (at the facility level) and an indicator for poor coal.
Bituminous coal is the most expensive of the commonly used coal coal types and
has the highest heat content and lowest ash content. The poor coal indicator
represents coal that is high in ash content and low in heat value. NOx-affected
non-attainment exit indicates years following exit from non-attainment for coal-
fired boilers. Unit of observation is the facility-year. Analysis sample is facilities
located in counties that were at one point designated as non-attainment and
installed capture technology as part of RACT requirements.
This pair of results identifies a second mechanism through which increases in NOx
emissions and emission rate occur once boilers exit non-attainment. Fuel optimization
and higher quality inputs are often part of regulatory requirements of SIPs; these actions
can decrease emissions and help areas reach attainment designation. However, these clean
strategies are costly. Estimation results show that once input requirements are removed
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profit maximizing firm managers acquire lower quality fuel at a much lower cost. Lower
heat content of these inputs requires firms to burn more coal to achieve the same level of
electrical production as with hotter burning coal. This results in emission increases.
7 Conclusion and policy implications
The purpose of this study is to examine how firms respond once regulatory stringency
and oversight substantially decreases. We examine this research question in the context
of CAA non-attainment designations that are affected by NOx emissions. Specifically, we
add to the literature by focusing explicitly on the effects of firm exit from non-attainment
designation on NOx emissions and emission rate at coal-fired power plants. We find
that emissions increase 16% and emission rates increase 9% once the increased regulatory
stringency and oversight of non-attainment designation is removed. We provide a second
important contribution in our examination of the mechanisms behind these emission in-
creases. Extended model results present evidence that emission increases are the result
of under-utilization of expensive emission reduction strategies by profit maximizing firms:
high variable cost abatement technology and the use of higher quality inputs.
Our results present important policy implications. We have shown that emission initia-
tives lose their effectiveness in the absence of direct regulatory oversight. Thus, regulator
attention is imperative for the proper implementation of environmental control policy.
Our results also suggest that abatement technologies with low (or zero) variable costs
may be preferred to those with high operating costs if regulatory oversight is not contin-
ual. We also highlight the inefficiencies of technology standards. The cost of emission
control technology (both installation and operation) and oversight is substantial, but in
the absence of continual oversight, inefficient. The high costs of technology standards
remove incentives for innovative or cheaper emission reduction strategies and create an
incentive to shirk costs when the regulator is not present.
We acknowledge that the need for future research remains. We have shown that
emission increases due to a reduction in regulatory oversight are caused primarily by
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under-utilization of clean strategies. However, we cannot identify exact costs of proper
technological operation. Future research should examine specific input requirements and
costs for abatement technology, e.g., reagents. We also examine one specific sector of
regulated firms. Results from coal-fired boilers may not apply broadly due to the specific
nature of sector-specific technology and inputs. Future research should examine more
sectors and emissions to different environmental media.
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